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Demos 2016-01-14 10:46:39 +00:00
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@ -41,12 +41,7 @@ The following is a technical approach:
When it comes to the topic of mass spying and "cyber" attacks, most of us will readily agree, that it's performed on large scale by an ecosystem of well equipped adversaries (Snowden revelations, botnets)
Furthermore that the first is a threat to a list of basic civil rights which back up our democracies. Where this agreement usually ends, however is the question of how to deal with it adequately.
Many people assume that the wild installation of a bunch of single purpose privacy tools works already very well to protect their privacy and that cryptoparties which teach GPG and Tor usage or decentralized Social Networking, aka Federation is the solution for our problem.
By focusing on single purpose solutions and the resulting need for cryptoparties, people overlook a significant number of disadvantages:
The wild installation means unawareness of the varying privacy assertions made. The tools compete for computing and channel resources.
It is very ineffective to teach every single user a various set of tools which in addition often lack convenience.
That results in average users to stick to more unsecure solutions though they know about its impact on their privacy.
Furthermore the long list of arising privacy projects- we have over 80 in our list - compete for contributors, funding, and users while implementing redundant, now and then mediocre solutions. Even the current internet stack which most projects set on is known to be vulnerable to a list of attacks basing on the stacks need and usage of '''central authorities'''. That is true for BGP routing, DNS and the server-client model, which makes the internet to an accumulation of many single points of failures (SPOF) that facilitate censorship, passive spying, and active intrusion on a global scale.
Many people assume that the wild installation of a bunch of single purpose privacy tools is sufficient to protect their privacy. Let alone the connected effort since these aren't shipped natively in one packet in most cases, people overlook other disadvantages: First, their users are unaware of the varying privacy assertions made by these solutions. Second, theses tools compete for computing and channel resources and users, which tend to use the widely used plattforms, where their friends can be found. Third, teaching users the various individual tools is very ineffective and inconvenient. This in turn, lets average users stick to more insecure but familiar solutions although they know about its impact on their privacy. Fourth, the long list of existing privacy projects (​​https://wiki.c3d2.de/EDN#Privacy_Projects) compete for contributors and funding while implementing redundant, sometimes mediocre solutions. Finally, even the current internet stack most projects utilize is known to be vulnerable to a list of attacks based on the stacks dependence on central authorities. This is true for BGP routing, DNS, and all client-server applications. Consequently, the internet stack can be seen as an accumulation of many single points of failures (SPOF) facilitating censorship, passive spying, and active intrusion on a global scale.
Yet a sober analysis of the matter reveals that the old internet stack and the wild installation is a bad basis for privacy efforts!
Hence, we believe that we need a completely new internet stack that provides high confidentiality, integrity of communication and censorship-resistance natively.