libcurl: up revision to 7.32.0
Updating revision of libcurl to version 7.32.0 Signed-off-by: Ryan Barnett <rjbarnet@rockwellcollins.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk>
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Ryan Barnett
Peter Korsgaard
parent
d1de1c0d1f
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9093cc451c
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From ee45a34907ffeb5fd95b0513040d8491d565b663 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Eldar Zaitov <kyprizel@volema.com>
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Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 23:22:27 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message: fix buffer overflow
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When negotiating SASL DIGEST-MD5 authentication, the function
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Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message() uses the data provided from the
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server without doing the proper length checks and that data is then
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appended to a local fixed-size buffer on the stack.
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This vulnerability can be exploited by someone who is in control of a
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server that a libcurl based program is accessing with POP3, SMTP or
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IMAP. For applications that accept user provided URLs, it is also
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thinkable that a malicious user would feed an application with a URL to
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a server hosting code targetting this flaw.
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130206.html
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---
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lib/curl_sasl.c | 23 ++++++-----------------
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/curl_sasl.c b/lib/curl_sasl.c
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index 57116b6..d07387d 100644
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--- a/lib/curl_sasl.c
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+++ b/lib/curl_sasl.c
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@@ -346,9 +346,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data,
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snprintf(&HA1_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]);
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/* Prepare the URL string */
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- strcpy(uri, service);
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- strcat(uri, "/");
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- strcat(uri, realm);
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+ snprintf(uri, sizeof(uri), "%s/%s", service, realm);
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/* Calculate H(A2) */
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ctxt = Curl_MD5_init(Curl_DIGEST_MD5);
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@@ -392,20 +390,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_sasl_create_digest_md5_message(struct SessionHandle *data,
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for(i = 0; i < MD5_DIGEST_LEN; i++)
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snprintf(&resp_hash_hex[2 * i], 3, "%02x", digest[i]);
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- strcpy(response, "username=\"");
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- strcat(response, userp);
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- strcat(response, "\",realm=\"");
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- strcat(response, realm);
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- strcat(response, "\",nonce=\"");
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- strcat(response, nonce);
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- strcat(response, "\",cnonce=\"");
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- strcat(response, cnonce);
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- strcat(response, "\",nc=");
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- strcat(response, nonceCount);
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- strcat(response, ",digest-uri=\"");
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- strcat(response, uri);
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- strcat(response, "\",response=");
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- strcat(response, resp_hash_hex);
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+ snprintf(response, sizeof(response),
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+ "username=\"%s\",realm=\"%s\",nonce=\"%s\","
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+ "cnonce=\"%s\",nc=\"%s\",digest-uri=\"%s\",response=%s",
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+ userp, realm, nonce,
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+ cnonce, nonceCount, uri, resp_hash_hex);
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/* Base64 encode the reply */
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return Curl_base64_encode(data, response, 0, outptr, outlen);
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--
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1.7.10.4
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@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
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From 3604fde3d3c9b0d0e389e079aecf470d123ba180 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: YAMADA Yasuharu <yasuharu.yamada@access-company.com>
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Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2013 00:17:15 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] cookie: fix tailmatching to prevent cross-domain leakage
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Cookies set for 'example.com' could accidentaly also be sent by libcurl
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to the 'bexample.com' (ie with a prefix to the first domain name).
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This is a security vulnerabilty, CVE-2013-1944.
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130412.html
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---
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lib/cookie.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
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1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c
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index 4b9ec0b..a67204e 100644
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--- a/lib/cookie.c
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+++ b/lib/cookie.c
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@@ -118,15 +118,29 @@ static void freecookie(struct Cookie *co)
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free(co);
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}
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-static bool tailmatch(const char *little, const char *bigone)
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+static bool tailmatch(const char *cooke_domain, const char *hostname)
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{
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- size_t littlelen = strlen(little);
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- size_t biglen = strlen(bigone);
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+ size_t cookie_domain_len = strlen(cooke_domain);
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+ size_t hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
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- if(littlelen > biglen)
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+ if(hostname_len < cookie_domain_len)
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return FALSE;
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- return Curl_raw_equal(little, bigone+biglen-littlelen) ? TRUE : FALSE;
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+ if(!Curl_raw_equal(cooke_domain, hostname+hostname_len-cookie_domain_len))
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+ return FALSE;
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+
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+ /* A lead char of cookie_domain is not '.'.
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+ RFC6265 4.1.2.3. The Domain Attribute says:
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+ For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is
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+ "example.com", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie
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+ header when making HTTP requests to example.com, www.example.com, and
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+ www.corp.example.com.
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+ */
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+ if(hostname_len == cookie_domain_len)
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+ return TRUE;
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+ if('.' == *(hostname + hostname_len - cookie_domain_len - 1))
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+ return TRUE;
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+ return FALSE;
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}
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/*
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--
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1.7.10.4
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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
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From 6032f0ff672f09babf69d9d42bcde6eb9eeb5bea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
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Date: Sun, 19 May 2013 23:24:29 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Curl_urldecode: no peeking beyond end of input buffer
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Security problem: CVE-2013-2174
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If a program would give a string like "%" to curl_easy_unescape(), it
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would still consider the % as start of an encoded character. The
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function then not only read beyond the buffer but it would also deduct
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the *unsigned* counter variable for how many more bytes there's left to
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read in the buffer by two, making the counter wrap. Continuing this, the
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function would go on reading beyond the buffer and soon writing beyond
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the allocated target buffer...
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Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20130622.html
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Reported-by: Timo Sirainen
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---
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lib/escape.c | 5 +++--
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/escape.c b/lib/escape.c
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index 6a26cf8..aa7db2c 100644
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--- a/lib/escape.c
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+++ b/lib/escape.c
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@@ -159,7 +159,8 @@ CURLcode Curl_urldecode(struct SessionHandle *data,
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while(--alloc > 0) {
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in = *string;
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- if(('%' == in) && ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
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+ if(('%' == in) && (alloc > 2) &&
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+ ISXDIGIT(string[1]) && ISXDIGIT(string[2])) {
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/* this is two hexadecimal digits following a '%' */
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char hexstr[3];
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char *ptr;
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--
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1.7.10.4
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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#
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################################################################################
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LIBCURL_VERSION = 7.28.1
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LIBCURL_VERSION = 7.32.0
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LIBCURL_SOURCE = curl-$(LIBCURL_VERSION).tar.bz2
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LIBCURL_SITE = http://curl.haxx.se/download
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LIBCURL_LICENSE = ICS
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@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ LIBCURL_CONF_ENV += ac_cv_lib_crypto_CRYPTO_lock=yes
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# Fix it by setting LD_LIBRARY_PATH to something sensible so those libs
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# are found first.
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LIBCURL_CONF_ENV += LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:/lib:/usr/lib
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LIBCURL_CONF_OPT += --with-ssl=$(STAGING_DIR)/usr \
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LIBCURL_CONF_OPT += --with-ssl \
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--with-random=/dev/urandom \
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--with-ca-path=/etc/ssl/certs
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else
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